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Dr. Jan C. Schuhr, Erlangen / Germany
 
 
Axiomatic Method and the Law
1 
 
Abstract: Whether an axiomatic approach to law is possible and useful today has to be perceived as 
unanswered.  Perception  of  the  axiomatic  method  among  lawyers,  however,  is  clouded  by 
misunderstanding. Clarifying them may generate new discussion about the axiomatization of legal 
theories. 
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I. Overview 
My following remarks concern the question: Should we reopen the debate on the axiomatic 
method in the field of law? 
More than any other, the mathematician David Hilbert propagated the modern axiomatic 
method.
2 A paper Hilbert published in 1918 provides a concise overview of this method:
3  
 
“When collecting the facts of a […] field of knowledge we soon recognize that we can bring them into 
order. We do this with […] the help of a framework of terms such that each object […] corresponds to 
a term […] and each fact […] corresponds to a logical relation between terms. The framework of 
terms is nothing but the theory of this field of knowledge.”
4 “Taking a closer look at a […] theory, we 
find  […]  that  the  framework  […]  is  based  upon  some  distinguished  propositions  of  the  field  of 
knowledge that suffice to develop the whole framework by means of logical principles.”
5 “We can 
                                                           
  The  author  teaches  courses  in  criminal  law,  criminal  procedure  and  legal  philosophy  at  the  Friedrich-
Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nürnberg and is assistant to Prof. Dr. Hans Kudlich. 
1 A German version of this paper w as presented at the IVR World Congress in Frankfurt am Main, Working 
Group 1 (Logics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Legal Informatics), Session 2a, August 19
th 2011. I 
would like to thank the participants in the discussion for their valuable remarks and Prof. Dr. Sharon Byrd for 
her help in preparing the English version. 
2 Concerning his predecessors see esp. H. C. Kennedy, The Origins of Modern Axiomatics,  The American 
Mathematical Monthly, vol. 79 (1972), 133 ff. and Christian Thiel, entry „Axiomensystem, Peanosches“, in: 
Historisches  Wörterbuch der Philosophie (=HWP), ed. by J. Ritter, vol. 1, Darmstadt 1971, 751, both with 
further references. Hilberts probably most influential show case for this method was his book Grundlagen der 
Geometrie (1
st ed. Leipzig 1899). 
3 David Hilbert, Axiomatisches Denken, Mathematische Annalen 78 (1918), 405 ff. 
4  „Wenn  wir  die  Tatsachen  eines  […]  Wissensgebiets  zusammenstellen,  so  bemerken  wir  bald,  daß  diese 
Tatsachen  einer  Ordnung  fähig  sind.  Diese  Ordnung  erfolgt  […]  mit  Hilfe  eines  gewissen  Fachwerks  von 
Begriffen in der Weise, daß dem einzelnen Gegenstande […] ein Begriff […] und jeder Tatsache […] eine 
logische Beziehung zwischen den Begriffen entspricht. Das Fachwerk der Begriffe ist nichts Anderes als die 
Theorie des Wissensgebietes.“ (l.c. p. 405; italics in the original) 
5 „Wenn wir eine […] Theorie näher betrachten, so erkennen wir […], daß der Konstruktion des Fachwerks […] 
einige wenige ausgezeichnete Sätze des Wissensgebiets zugrunde liegen und diese dann allein ausreichen, um 
aus ihnen nach logischen Prinzipien das ganze Fachwerk aufzubauen.“ (l.c. p. 406) 2 
view these basic propositions […] as the axioms of the individual fields of knowledge.”
6 “Everything 
that can be an object of academic thought passes to the axiomatic method, when it is mature enough to 
develop a theory.”
7  
 
The axiomatic method soon became the dominant methodological standard in the field of 
mathematics and proved useful in theories of physics, e.g. in Albert Einstein's general theory 
of  relativity  of  1916.
8  No later than when John von Neumann und Oskar Morgenstern 
published their axiomatization of game theory in 1944 did it reach economics.
9 In many other 
sciences and humanities it had varying, but sometimes remarkable success.
10  
The debate about the axiomatic method among German lawyers experienced its heyday 
in the 1970s. It then ebbed without result.  
 
II. The German debate in the 1970s 
Among  the  proponents  of  the  axiomatic  method  were  Ulrich  Klug,  Jürgen  Rödig,  Elmar 
Bund, Eike von Savigny and Ilmar Tammelo.
11 Among its sceptics were Karl Engisch, Claus-
                                                           
6 „Diese grundlegenden Sätze können […] als die Axiome der einzelnen Wissensgebiete angesehen werden.“ (l.c. 
p. 406; italics in the original) 
7 „Alles, was Gegenstand des wissenschaftlichen Denkens überhaupt sein kann, verfällt, sobald es zur Bildung 
einer Theorie reif ist, der Axiomatischen Methode […].“ (l.c. p. 415) 
8 See Albert Einstein, Die Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativitätstheorie,  Annalen der Physik, 4
th series vol. 49 
[1916], 769 ff. 
9 John v. Neumann/ Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 3
rd ed., New York 1953 
10 Note e.g. Karl Bühler, Die Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften,  Kant Studien vol. 38 [1933], 19, 22; idem, 
Die  Axiomatik  der  Sprachwissenschaften,  2
nd  ed.,  Frankfurt  a.M.  1976;  Carl  Friedrich  Graumann/  Theo 
Herrmann (ed.), Karl Bühlers Axiomatik, Frankfurt a.M. 1984 and Eberhard Rogge, Axiomatik alles möglichen 
Philosophierens,  Meisenheim/Glan  1950.  Impact  and  perspectives  of  the  modern  axiomatic  method  as 
propagated by Hilbert were discussed at the conference “Perspektiven axiomatischen Denkens” organized by 
Peter Bernhard and Damir Smiljanić at Erlangen 10.-11. 2. 2009. 
11 Esp. Ulrich Klug, Juristische Logik, 4
th ed., Berlin et al. 1982, § 3 2.c) (pp. 16 f.), § 17 2. and 3. (pp. 192 ff.), 
§ 18 (pp. 196 ff.); (also concerning Klug:) Karl Engisch, Aufgaben einer Logik und Methodik des juristischen 
Denkens, Studium Generale vol. 12. (1959), 76, 86; Jürgen Rödig, Axiomatisierbarkeit juristischer Systeme, in: 
Münchener  Ringvorlesung  EDV  und  Recht,  ed.  by  A.  Kaufmann,  Berlin  1973,  49 ff.,  reprint  in:  J.  Rödig, 
Schriften zur juristischen Logik (ed. by E. Bund/ B. Schmiedel/ G. Thieler-Mevissen), Berlin et al. 1980, 65 ff. 
(also  in  DVR 1972,  170 ff.);  idem,  Logische  Untersuchungen  zur  Makrostruktur  rechtlicher  Kodifikate,  in: 
Studien zu einer Theorie der Gesetzgebung, ed. by J. Rödig, Berlin et al. 1976, 592 ff.; idem, Einführung in eine 
analytische Rechtslehre, Berlin et al. 1986, 3.1 (p. 89); Elmar Bund, Die Verteilung des Versteigerungserlöses 
bei  relativem  Vorrang  axiomatisch  begründet,  in:  Gesetzgebungstheorie,  Juristische  Logik,  Zivil-  und 
Prozessrecht – Gedächtnisschrift für Jürgen Rödig, ed. by U. Klug/ Th. Ramm/ F. Ritter/ B. Schmiedel, Berlin et 
al. 1978 [=GS Rödig 1978], 211 ff.; idem, Juristische Logik und Argumentation, Freiburg 1983, § 9 IV. (p. 104), 
§ 16 (pp. 157 ff.); Eike v. Savigny, Zur Rolle der deduktiv-axiomatischen Methode in der Rechtswissenschaft, 
in: Rechtstheorie [the book, not the journal], ed. by G. Jahr/ W. Maihofer, Frankfurt a.M. 1971, 315 ff.; idem, 
Topik und Axiomatik: eine verfehlte Alternative, ARSP 59 (1973), 249 ff.; Ilmar Tammelo, Möglichkeiten und 
Perspektiven des formalen Rechtsdenkens, in: GS Rödig 1978 (see above), 191 ff.; idem, Modern Logic in the 
Service of Law, Wien et al. 1978, Part I I.1., pp. 10 f. 3 
Wilhelm Canaris, Karl Larenz and Theodor Viehweg.
12 Their debate revolved around whether 
an axiomatic approach to law was possible and useful.  
To a remarkable extent the two opponents wrote at cross-purposes. The supporters’ main 
thrust was that the axiomatic method in the sense of Hilbert (and Ackermann)
13 can be used in 
every science and humanity and therefore also in the area of law. The main argument of their 
opponents was that legal questions cannot be solved more geometrico in the sense of Aristotle 
and Euclid.
14 
Promoters and detractors basically referred to different notions of an axiom,   namely 
promoters to Hilbert’s (and Ackermann’s), detractors to Aristotle’s and Euclid’s. The latter 
notion  presupposes  generally  accepted,  eternal  truth.  Natural  law  doctrine  and 
“Begriffsjurisprudenz”  (which  was  a  conceptual  approach  to  legal  interpretation
15) were 
oriented toward this notion of an axiom. The detractors' criticism of the axiomatic method 
oftentimes  was  predicated  upon  fear  that  natural  law  doctrine  and  “Begriffsjurisprudenz” 
would experience a revival. Modern axiomatics, however, refers to axioms in the sense of 
Hilbert and Ackermann. They are more or less arbitrary and exchangeable assumptions. They 
have nothing to do with natural law doctrine or “Begriffsjurisprudenz”.
16 No party in the 
debate claimed that axioms in the Aristotle and Euclid sense exist in legal doctrine, and no 
party refuted axioms in the Hilbert and Ackermann sense in the law. 
Similar problems surrounded the discussion regarding utility: The proponents stressed 
that it is useful to report existent knowledge according to its logical structure and verify its 
consistency. The opponents did not dispute this point, but argued that many important legal 
questions  cannot  be  resolved  in  this  way.  However,  nobody  insisted  that  the  axiomatic 
method should become the only method to deal with the law. Axioms of a theory can never be 
motivated by applying the axiomatic method to these very axioms; the whole point of axioms 
is that they cannot be deduced from within the very theory that is based on them. Yet also for 
                                                           
12 Karl Engisch, Wahrheit und Richtigkeit im juristischen Denken, München 1963, 18; idem, Sinn und Tragweite 
juristischer Systematik,  Studium Generale vol. 10 (1957), 176 f.; Claus-Wilhelm  Canaris,  Systemdenken und 
Systembegriff  in  der  Jurisprudenz,  2
nd  ed.,  Berlin  1983,  21 ff.,  27 ff.;  Karl  Larenz,  Methodenlehre  der 
Rechtswissenschaft,  6
th  ed.,  Berlin  et  al.  1991,  I. Teil  5. Kap.  7.  (p. 166);  Theodor  Viehweg,  Topik  und 
Jurisprudenz, München 1953, § 7 III f. (p. 58 ff.). 
13 David Hilbert/ Wilhelm Ackermann, Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik, 6
th ed., Berlin et al. 1972, § 8, p. 22 
(1
st ed. 1928). 
14  See e.g. Aristotele,  Analytica  posteriora  I,  2  (72a17  in:  Aristotelis  Opera,  ed.  by  Bekker,  vol. 1,  Berlin 
[Berolini] 1831); idem, Topica VIII (159a3 ff. in the Bekker-ed., printed as p. 155 due to false pagination); 
Euclid, The Elements (στοιχʵĩον), about 300 b.c. (Die Elemente, ed. & transl. by C. Thaer, Ostwalds Klassiker 
vol. 235, 236, 240, 241 u. 243, Leipzig 1933-1937, reprint Frankfurt a.M. 1997) passim; see also L. Oeing-
Hanhoff, entry „Axiom, II. Geschichte“, in: HWP (Fn. 2), 741 ff. 
15  For  more  details  and  a  critical  discussion  of  this  pejorative  denomination  see  Jan  Schröder,  entry 
„Begriffsjurisprudenz“,  in:  Handwörterbuch  zur  deutschen  Rechtsgeschichte,  2
nd  ed.,  vol. I,  Berlin  2008, 
col. 500-502. 
16 Cf. Elmar Bund, Juristische Logik und Argumentation, Freiburg 1983, § 9 IV. (p. 104). 4 
an axiomatized theory of an area of law – that is an axiomatized legal theory – the motivation 
of its axioms would still be the main topic of legal dogma.  
I do not want to claim that no real controversies arose. Yet the analysis reveals that the 
core positions were in no real conflict.  
As a result, the debate treated the basic question – whether the axiomatic method, which 
had been very successful in other sciences and humanities, should be applied in the field of 
law – at most superficially. Eike von Savigny and others alluded to that superficiality in the 
1970s.
17 Most discussants, however, seem to have been more interested in their own positions 
than in discussing a common question. The discussion waned without having made any real 
progress. Today lawyers ignore axiomatics; logicians of  the law at most silently regret that 
and work on other problems. 
 
III. Should we care? 
Every vendor has to put up with lack of demand for his or her products. Lawyers are not 
obliged to make logicians happy. Nonetheless we need to consider a problem here that is 
common to all sciences: 
Time and again the methods of one science have been adapted and successfully applied 
to others. This is why we have specialists for questions of method – esp. logicians. They 
develop  prototypes  of  methods  independent  from  subject  sciences.  Only  experience  in 
applying a method to real cases, however, can tell whether the method is useful – that is 
effective  and  efficient.  Generally  scientists  are  uninterested  in  importing  new  methods 
because they already have their own methods and prefer to adhere to the proven and tested. 
Hence progress in terms of method is mainly left to fate. Fellow scientists will usually not 
hinder someone who happens to be an expert in two sciences from transferring a method from 
one to the other in a personal showing of strength, but apart from that scientists can be quite 
hostile against progress in terms of method. 
To assess whether that is good or not, let us consider the four possible basic cases: 1. A 
method is tested and proven useful. That is fine. 2. A method is not tested and would not have 
proven useful. That is fine as well. 3. A method is tested and does not prove useful. That is a 
pity, because effort was spent without benefit. 4. A method is not tested but would have 
proven useful. That also is a pity, because science misses out on the benefits of the method.  
The common approach avoids detriments of the first kind (case 3) but accepts detriments 
of the second kind (case 4) practically without limitation. That is inefficient. Still to limit both 
                                                           
17 L.c. Fn. 11. 5 
kinds of detriments, one must accept some risk of incurring each of them. To require a proven 
and tested method – that is positive experience in applying this very method – before even 
considering giving it a try, prevents progress in terms of method from occurring . On the other 
hand, nobody can spend unlimited effort on testing methods that might just flop. As a general 
rule it will be most advantageous to decide incrementally basing each decision on indicators: 
first evaluate whether a new method should be published, then whether it should be tested in 
small projects and later decide whether to conduct larger test projects. Broad application or 
ultimate rejection can then be based on meaningful test results, while a preliminary rejection 
remains possible when (and as long as) there is not sufficient indication that the method 
would prove beneficial.  
 
IV. Common misunderstandings 
I regard the success of the axiomatic method in a number of different sciences and humanities 
that have much in common with legal scholarship as sufficient reason at least to clarify some 
common misunderstandings about this method among lawyers: 
 
1. Aims and Utility: The axiomatic method orders existent knowledge according to its logical 
structure and detects contradictions, ambiguities and gaps in rationale. It does not generate 
new knowledge, but provides indications of where to delve deeper. The axiomatic method is 
useful  because  logical  structure  clearly  arranges  knowledge  without  relinquishing 
completeness. This form of clarity is quite different from one created by selecting some issues 
to consider and neglecting others (which has its own costs and benefits). 
 
2.  Interpretation  and  Analogy:  Consistency  is  the  prime  characteristic  of  an  axiomatic 
system. Axioms should also be complete and independent, but lawyers tend to misunderstand 
these features. Independency merely avoids redundancy. An axiomatic system is complete 
once all intended propositions can be derived from it. Completeness does not mean that the 
theory  answers all legal  questions; it does  not forbid  interpretation  and analogy. When  a 
lawyer applies an axiomatized theory to a case and finds it does not solve the case, he or she 
is free to extend the theory by means of adding ad hoc premises (limited perhaps by rules that 
designate the relevant sources of law but not by the rules of the axiomatic method). Thus the 
axiomatic method can be appropriate for both civil law systems and common law systems. 
 6 
3. Convertibility of Axioms and the Sources of Law: Axioms can be changed leading to 
new theories based on these new axioms. Modern axioms need not contain guaranteed truths 
and are in no way absolute; therefore modern axiomatics is principally different from – but 
still consistent with – natural law doctrine and “Begriffsjurisprudenz”. Guaranteed truths (or 
binding law), on the other hand, need not be expressed as axioms. Statutory law, binding 
precedents and other sources of law generally are not, without more, a suitable basis for a 
consistent legal system. It is rather the function of a proper legal theory to develop the content 
of the relevant sources of law, thus clarifying them and delineating their scope.  
 
4. Limited Field of Application: The axiomatic method does not account for the axioms of a 
theory but rather presupposes them. Axioms need to be motivated, but the axiomatic method 
cannot  be  applied  to  do  so.
18  Therefore the axiomatic method neither poses a threat nor 
attempts to dominate legal reasoning.  
 
5. Formalisms:  Axiomatized theories need not  be presented in  a  formula code. Whether 
axiomatizing a theory or formalizing it is worthwhile, are two different questions. Both can be 
true at the same time, but need not be.  
 
6. Value of Preliminary Efforts:  It is certainly impossible to  axiomatize an entire legal 
system in the short term. Moreover, nobody can know today whether that would be at all 
beneficial. Yet certain preliminary efforts are useful at any rate. This is especially true for 
disclosing one's own premises and clarifying one's terms. Today it is quite common in legal 
argumentation to engross other positions. Engrossment works by coating both one’s own and 
someone  else’s  premises  and  applying  rhetorical  camouflage  to  the  terms  used.  To  build 
proper  theories,  however,  one  needs  to  reveal  the  intended  application  of  the  terms  and 
discuss their boundaries (which is far more important than defining them, because definitions 
are  not  safe  from  rhetorical  camouflage  themselves).  Also,  the  premises  of  the  decisive 
arguments need to be made explicit. Both are necessary first steps before the development 
even of small deductive theories can become possible. Yet both steps deserve to become the 
methodological standard regardless of whether or not the axiomatic method should be pursued 
in the field of law in the long run. 
 
                                                           
18 Of course the axiomatic method can be applied when creating a larger theory that contains the old axioms as 
derived propositions. Still this merely transfers the burden to motivate the axioms to the new axioms of the 
larger theory. 7 
V. Result 
The question whether axiomatizations can be useful in legal dogma today has to be perceived 
as unanswered. For lack of sufficient testing there is no basis for large projects to axiomatize 
legal theories now. But perception of the axiomatic method among lawyers is clouded by 
misunderstanding that needs to be clarified. This in turn may generate new discussion about 
the axiomatization of legal theories. 
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